Editor’s note: In this opinion piece, Kimutai Kirui tells Interior Cabinet Secretary Kipchumba Murkomen that there should be no sacred cows. He calls for equal enforcement and accountability.
We adress this to county security committee as well,uasim Gishu county but first things first.
“Is Hon murkomen be sitting at the apex of this network?
“Is CS Murkomen the weakest link in the fight against second-generation alcohol, or are deeper institutional compromises undermining enforcement?”
If he’s loyal supporter of the president why this sluggish or selective enforcement?
The fight against illicit alcohol, industrial ethanol and narcotics in Eldoret raises fundamental questions about “law enforcement, political influence, institutional accountability and the possible protection of powerful commercial interests”
Ethanol and second-generation alcohol are ravaging our youth, eroding productivity, crippling economic potential and burdening an already strained health sector.
We are not just losing a generation to addiction; we are mortgaging our economic future.
The law cannot be ruthless against a woman brewing chang’aa in Kiambaa, Ziwa, Cheptiret or Chepkunyuk, yet accommodating towards a commercially powerful establishment suspected of selling adulterated alcohol.
We eradicate busaa and paved way for drugs.
Heroin and other hard drugs are also reportedly circulating in Eldoret CBD. If criminal networks can operate with such audacity in the President’s own backyard, “where else are they expected to fear the law?”
Who finances, protects and controls these lucrative but destructive networks? Who are the powerful interests behind them
This is not necessarily the President’s failure. It is a serious indictment of the security institutions entrusted with implementing his directives.
When cartels thrive under their watch, the problem is not a shortage of laws but potentially compromised enforcement, institutional accountability and political will.
1. THE GREAT CONTRADICTION: ARREST THE DRIVER, PROTECT THE BARON
President Ruto issued clear directives.
Security operations have been announced, consignments intercepted and arrests made. Yet “the alleged kingpins remain conspicuously absent from the enforcement picture! “
In Uasin Gishu, drivers transporting consignments are arrested, watchmen guarding manufacturing premises prosecuted, and small-scale retailers bear the brunt of enforcement.
Some retailers have alleged demands for weekly police payments of KSh 4,000.
This is evident at Langas and Eldoret Police Stations. Retailers who fail to remit payments are prosecuted, even with receipts and documentation tracing their supply chains. Yet wholesalers and distributors appear beyond comparable scrutiny.
Why is the law ruthless at the bottom but timid at the top? Arresting retailers while sparing principal suppliers is not a crackdown; it is selective enforcement. Who is being protected—and why?**
But where are the financiers, manufacturers, landlords, vehicle owners and distributors?
How do you dismantle a cartel by arresting its delivery personnel while leaving its alleged architects untouched?
Why are drivers arrested, watchmen prosecuted and retailers sacrificed while the people financing, manufacturing and distributing these products remain largely beyond public scrutiny?
A crackdown that reaches only the last link in the supply chain is not dismantling a cartel. It risks protecting the hierarchy of impunity while sacrificing its foot soldiers.
2. THE POLICE: ENFORCERS OR FACILITATORS
There are serious allegations that police connections are being exploited to facilitate the transportation, protection and distribution of illicit alcohol and industrial ethanol.
Questions have also arisen about police escorts allegedly accompanying consignments in circumstances resembling the protection afforded to legitimate commercial cargo.
Chief Inspectors and Inspectors commanding stations and posts occupy critical positions in local operational structures.
Their deployment, supervision and professional independence therefore deserve particular scrutiny.
There are allegations that officers are strategically retained in lucrative corridors to protect commercial interests, including businesses allegedly linked to influential political and business personalities.
How do officers below the rank of Chief Inspector remain in the same locality for more than 15 years without meaningful rotation?
Why do some officers reportedly resist transfer orders?
“Who gives them the political cover to treat lawful command as optional?”
When police postings become instruments of private commercial protection, institutional integrity and public confidence are compromised.
“Is this policing, or the institutionalisation of private protection under the cover of state authority?”
The Inspector-General and relevant police oversight authorities must examine posting patterns, transfer resistance, operational conduct and allegations of interference.
3. CI JAMES LENASO: FROM CHANG’AA RAIDS TO THE ETHANOL CONTROVERSY
He appears useful to entrenched police networks, commercial interests and political power brokers in Uasin Gishu. His first posting was Kiambaa Police Station—a history that warrants scrutiny.
In Kiambaa, Lenaso was reportedly a familiar face, moving around in a Probox or on a boda boda while pursuing traditional brewers.
He subsequently served in Baharini, Kabiyemit and Langas, including assignments involving petty crime and later Jua Kali Police Station.
Today, he is the OCS Eldoret, the same station where he previously served as Deputy OCS.
This raises legitimate questions:
“What has changed: the alcohol economy, policing priorities or the people controlling the trade?”
– Why was enforcement uncompromising against women brewing chang’aa and busaa, yet the industrial ethanol economy appears to present greater enforcement challenges?
– What are his professional and operational relationships with individuals operating in Eldoret CBD, including alleged goon networks?
– What did police know about the Kiambaa brewing plant, when did they know it, and what action followed?
Lenaso has been identified in allegations as a possible coordination and focal point in networks requiring investigation.
These claims must be independently examined, and he must be afforded an opportunity to respond.
The question is not whether traditional brewers should face the law. It is why the same determination appears so difficult to sustain against commercially powerful operators
4. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES AND THE APPARENT RETREAT
MURKOMEN: THE WEAK LINK IN THE WAR?
Cabinet Secretary for Interior, Hon. Onesimus Murkomen, must account for the implementation of the President’s directives.
The security apparatus enjoys presidential goodwill, institutional backing and clear policy direction. “Where, then, is the implementation deficit?”
Could Hon murkomen be sitting at the apex of this network?
“Is CS Murkomen the weakest link in the fight against second-generation alcohol, or are deeper institutional compromises undermining enforcement?”
Presidential directives must translate into measurable outcomes. Where implementation fails, responsibility must be identifiable and accountability unavoidable.
The Interior CS’s political interpretation or administrative discretion cannot dilute, distort or override a Presidential directive. **Nor can political goodwill substitute for performance.** Execution rests squarely with the National Police Service. The President cannot chase every failure on the ground; that is why those entrusted with command must deliver—or be held accountable.
Murkomen’s political associations and relationships with influential figures also deserve scrutiny where specific allegations of interference arise.
The central question is whether political and commercial connections are being exploited to frustrate enforcement by persons not so close to the president but Murkomen.
Murkomen has a say over w
When political proximity becomes more valuable than the rule of law, public security risks becoming an instrument of private interests.
President Ruto issued directives against illicit alcohol and narcotics at Eldoret State Lodge and subsequently in Moiben Sub-County.
However, concerns arose following Murkomen’s Eldoret visit, particularly over his caution to security agencies against targeting registered outlets.
Why the special caveats for high-end establishments?
Since when did registration become immunity from investigation?
Are adulterated products manufactured exclusively in informal settlements? Can an expensive entertainment establishment escape scrutiny simply because it holds a business permit or enjoys influential connections?
Registration does not legalise adulteration, unlawful manufacture or distribution.
Adulterated alcohol, including products marketed as James Walker, is reportedly manufactured in Eldoret. These allegations require forensic testing and investigations into the entire supply chain.
Questions have also been raised about the authenticity of products sold in high-end entertainment establishments, including VIP.
If CS Murkomen claims not to know these networks, why did his remarks during the Eldoret visit appear to shield high-end clubs from police scrutiny?
Why the apparent departure from the President’s directives in the very city where those directives were said?
Is Murkomen positioning himself as an alternative voice to the President—or, at worst, creating a parallel centre of power?
We ask murkomen again,”Does the law stop at the entrance of an expensive club?
Does commercial status confer immunity from public health and criminal investigations?”
6. THE MARAKWET CONNECTION: IS THE ALLEGED BARON REALLY ON THE RUN?
Murkomen previously identified Matthew Chesos, a Marakwet individual, as an alleged operator reportedly on the run.
But is he actually on the run? Has his alleged manufacturing operation been dismantled? Have his financiers and distribution networks been investigated?
His vehicle was reportedly impounded. What became of it? Were its impoundment and subsequent handling independently examined? Were investigating officers intimidated or obstructed?
Chesos has also featured in allegations concerning professional and personal associations with Lenaso and individuals within Murkomen’s circle, including a photojournalist. These claims warrant independent scrutiny.
**Chesos is reportedly so feared that when he tells an officer, “I will have you transferred,” transfers allegedly follow.** The National Police Service and intelligence agencies can verify this directly with affected officers.
Lenaso, meanwhile, is accused of treating parts of Eldoret as his personal fiefdom, where even DCI officers allegedly fear to investigate powerful operators lest they face transfers. He reportedly mocks officers transferred after attempting to investigate alleged alcohol barons.
So, “who commands Eldoret’s police—the law or Lenaso’s alleged fiefdom?”
Reports that Chesos may still be involved in manufacturing or distributing illicit alcohol demand urgent investigation.
Public declarations are not enforcement. The public deserves evidence: dismantled operations, investigated financiers, prosecutions and convictions—not press statements and scapegoats.
Murkomen Acknowledged in Eldoret media brief Chessos is one of his own and on the run.
7. FROM LOCAL BREWS TO INDUSTRIAL ETHANOL CARTELS
Eldoret’s illicit alcohol problem has evolved beyond traditional chang’aa and busaa brewing.
The emerging concerns involve industrial ethanol, alleged diversion of supplies and organised distribution networks.
Areas frequently mentioned include Annex, particularly around Moi University, Kapsoiya, Langas, Kipkaren, Huruma, Maili Nne, Kesses and Chepkoilel.
Investigations must establish who controls the supply chains, who owns the manufacturing premises, who finances the operations and who distributes the products.
Ownership records, vehicle registrations, electricity consumption records and financial trails could provide critical investigative leads.
There are also serious concerns about the handling of police investigation files by the DCI and ODPP.
Questions have been raised about incomplete investigations, omitted ownership details and delays in prosecution. For instance, investigators should establish who owns the premises where consignments are recovered, who pays the electricity bills, who owns the vehicles and who finances the operations.
KPLC records, land records, vehicle ownership documents and financial investigations could help establish beneficial ownership.
Where police files repeatedly move between investigators and prosecutors without resolving material evidential gaps, accountability must be established.
There are also concerns that applications for the release of impounded vehicles may undermine investigations where proper safeguards are not maintained.
The DCI and ODPP must ensure that evidential requirements are addressed before prosecution decisions are made and that property-related proceedings do not unnecessarily frustrate legitimate investigations.
8. THE QUESTIONS THAT CANNOT BE WISHED AWAY
The security establishment, DCI, IPOA and ODPP must address the following:
1. Who finances and controls the industrial ethanol supply chains?
2. Who owns the manufacturing premises, vehicles and distribution networks?
3. Have alleged political and commercial connections been independently investigated?
4. What are CI James Lenaso’s professional and operational relationships with the individuals mentioned in these allegations?
5. Why have presidential directives not translated into sustained action against major operators?
6. Have officers been transferred, threatened or frustrated for pursuing investigations into influential individuals?
7. What has happened to the investigations and cases initiated from April 2025?
8. Why do drivers, watchmen, caretakers and retailers bear the greatest burden of enforcement?
9. What happened to the impounded vehicle associated with the alleged operator identified by Murkomen?
10. Have investigators followed the money and established beneficial ownership across the supply chain?
The DCI, IPOA and ODPP must independently examine these concerns, audit relevant investigations and establish whether public officers have abused their positions to protect illicit commercial interests.
9. THE FINAL INDICTMENT: ARREST THE BARONS, NOT THEIR ERRAND BOYS
CS Murkomen must account for the implementation of the President’s directives.
Police leadership must explain its operational decisions. Investigators must follow the money, establish beneficial ownership and trace the entire supply chain.
Every public officer named must answer specific, verifiable questions.
No political office, police rank, business empire or personal association should confer immunity.
We are engaging elected leaders and opinion shapers on the prospect of a formal parliamentary petition to demand accountability and institutional oversight.
The real measure of this campaign is not the number of drivers arrested, consignments seized or press statements issued. It is whether manufacturers, financiers, distributors and alleged protectors are investigated and held accountable wherever evidence establishes wrongdoing.
The public deserves equal enforcement, not selective prosecution.
ARREST THE DRIVER. PROSECUTE THE WATCHMAN. FINE THE RETAILER. PROTECT THE BARON
That is the grotesque contradiction we must confront.
NO VIP EXEMPTIONS. NO SACRED COWS. EQUAL ENFORCEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALL
The author is Kimutai Kirui, a Kenyan political analyst and human rights activist known for his work in Uasin Gishu County, where he has championed justice in cases ranging from police brutality to land disputes affecting widows.
Views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the editorial position of news9.africa.
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